Chapter 15: System Security



Chapter 15: System Security

- The Security Problem
- Program Threats
- System and Network Threats
- Cryptography as a Security Tool
- User Authentication
- Implementing Security Defenses
- Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks
- Computer-Security Classifications
- An Example: Windows XP

Objectives

- To discuss security threats and attacks
- To explain the fundamentals of encryption, authentication, and hashing
- To examine the uses of cryptography in computing
- To describe the various countermeasures to security attacks

The Security Problem

- Security must consider external environment of the system, and protect the system resources
- Intruders (crackers) attempt to breach security
- **Threat** is potential security violation
- **Attack** is attempt to breach security
- Attack can be accidental or malicious
- Easier to protect against accidental than malicious misuse

Security Violations

- Categories
  - **Breach of confidentiality**
  - **Breach of integrity**
  - **Breach of availability**
  - **Theft of service**
  - **Denial of service**
- Methods
  - **Masquerading (breach authentication)**
  - **Replay attack**
    - **Message modification**
  - **Man-in-the-middle attack**
  - **Session hijacking**

Standard Security Attacks



Security Measure Levels

- Security must occur at four levels to be effective:
  - Physical
  - Human
    - Avoid **social engineering, phishing, dumpster diving**
  - Operating System
  - Network
- Security is as week as the weakest chain

Program Threats

- Trojan Horse
  - Code segment that misuses its environment
  - Exploits mechanisms for allowing programs written by users to be executed by other users
  - **Spyware, pop-up browser windows, covert channels**
- Trap Door
  - Specific user identifier or password that circumvents normal security procedures
  - Could be included in a compiler
- Logic Bomb
  - Program that initiates a security incident under certain circumstances
- Stack and Buffer Overflow
  - Exploits a bug in a program (overflow either the stack or memory buffers)

C Program with Buffer-overflow Condition

```
#include <stdio.h>
#define BUFFER SIZE 256
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
   char buffer[BUFFER SIZE];
   if (argc < 2)
       return -1;
   else {
       strcpy(buffer,argv[1]);
       return 0;
   }
}
```


Layout of Typical Stack Frame



Modified Shell Code

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
   execvp(‘‘\bin\sh’’,‘‘\bin \sh’’, NULL);
   return 0;
}
```


Hypothetical Stack Frame



(a) Before attack

(b) After attack

Program Threats (Cont.)

- Viruses
  - Code fragment embedded in legitimate program
  - Very specific to CPU architecture, operating system, applications
  - Usually borne via email or as a macro
    - Visual Basic Macro to reformat hard drive

```
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim oFS
  Set oFS = CreateObject(''Scripting.FileSystemObject'')
  vs = Shell(''c:command.com /k format     c:'',vbHide)
End Sub
```


Program Threats (Cont.)

- **Virus dropper** inserts virus onto the system
- Many categories of viruses, literally many thousands of viruses
  - File
  - Boot
  - Macro
  - Source code
  - Polymorphic
  - Encrypted
  - Stealth
  - Tunneling
  - Multipartite
  - Armored

A Boot-sector Computer Virus



System and Network Threats

- Worms – use **spawn** mechanism; standalone program
- Internet worm
  - Exploited UNIX networking features (remote access) and bugs in *finger* and *sendmail* programs
  - **Grappling hook** program uploaded main worm program
- Port scanning
  - Automated attempt to connect to a range of ports on one or a range of IP addresses
- Denial of Service
  - Overload the targeted computer preventing it from doing any useful work
  - Distributed denial-of-service (**DDOS**) come from multiple sites at once

The Morris Internet Worm



Cryptography as a Security Tool

- Broadest security tool available
  - Source and destination of messages cannot be trusted without cryptography
  - Means to constrain potential senders (*sources*) and / or receivers (*destinations*) of *messages*
- Based on secrets (**keys**)

Secure Communication over Insecure Medium



Encryption

- Encryption algorithm consists of
  - Set of *K* keys
  - Set of *M* Messages
  - Set of *C* ciphertexts (encrypted messages)
  - A function $E : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow C)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $E(k)$ is a function for generating ciphertexts from messages.
    - Both *E* and *E*(*k*) for any *k* should be efficiently computable functions.
  - A function $D : K \rightarrow (C \rightarrow M)$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $D(k)$ is a function for generating messages from ciphertexts.
    - Both *D* and *D*(*k*) for any *k* should be efficiently computable functions.
- An encryption algorithm must provide this essential property: Given a ciphertext $c \in C$, a computer can compute *m* such that $E(k)(m) = c$ only if it possesses *D*(*k*).
  - Thus, a computer holding *D*(*k*) can decrypt ciphertexts to the plaintexts used to produce them, but a computer not holding *D*(*k*) cannot decrypt ciphertexts.
  - Since ciphertexts are generally exposed (for example, sent on the network), it is important that it be infeasible to derive *D*(*k*) from the ciphertexts

Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used to encrypt and decrypt
  - *E*(*k*) can be derived from *D*(*k*), and vice versa
- DES is most commonly used symmetric block-encryption algorithm (created by US Govt)
  - Encrypts a block of data at a time
- Triple-DES considered more secure
- Advanced Encryption Standard (**AES**), **twofish** up and coming
- RC4 is most common symmetric stream cipher, but known to have vulnerabilities
  - Encrypts/decrypts a stream of bytes (i.e wireless transmission)
  - Key is a input to psuedo-random-bit generator
    - Generates an infinite **keystream**

Asymmetric Encryption

- Public-key encryption based on each user having two keys:
  - public key – published key used to encrypt data
  - private key – key known only to individual user used to decrypt data
- Must be an encryption scheme that can be made public without making it easy to figure out the decryption scheme
  - Most common is RSA block cipher
  - Efficient algorithm for testing whether or not a number is prime
  - No efficient algorithm is know for finding the prime factors of a number

Asymmetric Encryption (Cont.)

- Formally, it is computationally infeasible to derive $D(k_d, N)$ from $E(k_e, N)$, and so $E(k_e, N)$ need not be kept secret and can be widely disseminated
  - $E(k_e, N)$ (or just k_e) is the **public key**
  - $D(k_d, N)$ (or just k_d) is the **private key**
  - N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q (for example, p and q are 512 bits each)
  - Encryption algorithm is $E(k_e, N)(m) = m^{k_e} \bmod N$, where k_e satisfies $k_e k_d \bmod (p-1)(q-1) = 1$
  - The decryption algorithm is then $D(k_d, N)(c) = c^{k_d} \bmod N$

Asymmetric Encryption Example

- For example. make $p = 7$and $q = 13$
- We then calculate $N = 7*13 = 91$ and $(p-1)(q-1) = 72$
- We next select k_e relatively prime to 72 and< 72, yielding 5
- Finally,we calculate k_d such that $k_e k_d \bmod 72 = 1$, yielding 29
- We how have our keys
  - Public key, $k_e, N = 5, 91$
  - Private key, $k_d, N = 29, 91$
- Encrypting the message 69 with the public key results in the cyphertext 62
- Cyphertext can be decoded with the private key
  - Public key can be distributed in cleartext to anyone who wants to communicate with holder of public key

Encryption and Decryption using RSA Asymmetric Cryptography



Cryptography (Cont.)

- Note symmetric cryptography based on transformations, asymmetric based on mathematical functions
  - Asymmetric much more compute intensive
  - Typically not used for bulk data encryption

Authentication

- Constraining set of potential senders of a message
  - Complementary and sometimes redundant to encryption
  - Also can prove message unmodified
- Algorithm components
  - A set K of keys
  - A set M of messages
  - A set A of authenticators
  - A function $S : K \rightarrow (M \rightarrow A)$
    - That is, for each $k \in K$, $S(k)$ is a function for generating authenticators from messages
    - Both S and $S(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions
  - A function $V : K \rightarrow (M \times A \rightarrow \{\text{true, false}\})$. That is, for each $k \in K$, $V(k)$ is a function for verifying authenticators on messages
    - Both V and $V(k)$ for any k should be efficiently computable functions

Authentication (Cont.)

- For a message m, a computer can generate an authenticator $a \in A$ such that $V(k)(m, a)$ = `true` only if it possesses $S(k)$
- Thus, computer holding $S(k)$ can generate authenticators on messages so that any other computer possessing $V(k)$ can verify them
- Computer not holding $S(k)$ cannot generate authenticators on messages that can be verified using $V(k)$
- Since authenticators are generally exposed (for example, they are sent on the network with the messages themselves), it must not be feasible to derive $S(k)$ from the authenticators

Authentication – Hash Functions

- Basis of authentication
- Creates small, fixed-size block of data (**message digest, hash value**) from *m*
- Hash Function *H* must be collision resistant on *m*
  - Must be infeasible to find an $m' \neq m$ such that $H(m) = H(m')$
- If $H(m) = H(m')$, then $m = m'$
  - The message has not been modified
- Common message-digest functions include **MD5**, which produces a 128-bit hash, and **SHA-1**, which outputs a 160-bit hash

Authentication - MAC

- Symmetric encryption used in **message-authentication code** (**MAC**) authentication algorithm
- Simple example:
  - MAC defines $S(k)(m) = f(k, H(m))$
    - Where *f* is a function that is one-way on its first argument
      - *k* cannot be derived from $f(k, H(m))$
    - Because of the collision resistance in the hash function, reasonably assured no other message could create the same MAC
    - A suitable verification algorithm is $V(k)(m, a) \equiv (f(k,m) = a)$
    - Note that *k* is needed to compute both $S(k)$ and $V(k)$, so anyone able to compute one can compute the other

Authentication – Digital Signature

- Based on asymmetric keys and digital signature algorithm
- Authenticators produced are **digital signatures**
- In a digital-signature algorithm, computationally infeasible to derive $S(k_s)$ from $V(k_v)$
  - V is a one-way function
  - Thus, k_v is the public key and k_s is the private key
- Consider the RSA digital-signature algorithm
  - Similar to the RSA encryption algorithm, but the key use is reversed
  - Digital signature of message $S(k_s)(m) = H(m)^{k_s} \bmod N$
  - The key k_s again is a pair d, N, where N is the product of two large, randomly chosen prime numbers p and q
  - Verification algorithm is $V(k_v)(m, a) \equiv (a^{k_v} \bmod N = H(m))$
    - Where k_v satisfies $k_v k_s \bmod (p - 1)(q - 1) = 1$

Authentication (Cont.)

- Why authentication if a subset of encryption?
  - Fewer computations (except for RSA digital signatures)
  - Authenticator usually shorter than message
  - Sometimes want authentication but not confidentiality
    - Signed patches et al
  - Can be basis for **non-repudiation**

Key Distribution

- Delivery of symmetric key is huge challenge
  - Sometimes done **out-of-band**
- Asymmetric keys can proliferate – stored on **key ring**
  - Even asymmetric key distribution needs care – man-in-the-middle attack

Man-in-the-middle Attack on Asymmetric Cryptography



Digital Certificates

- Proof of who or what owns a public key
- Public key digitally signed a trusted party
- Trusted party receives proof of identification from entity and certifies that public key belongs to entity
- Certificate authority are trusted party – their public keys included with web browser distributions
  - They vouch for other authorities via digitally signing their keys, and so on

Encryption Example - SSL

- Insertion of cryptography at one layer of the ISO network model (the transport layer)
- SSL – Secure Socket Layer (also called TLS)
- Cryptographic protocol that limits two computers to only exchange messages with each other
  - Very complicated, with many variations
- Used between web servers and browsers for secure communication (credit card numbers)
- The server is verified with a **certificate** assuring client is talking to correct server
- Asymmetric cryptography used to establish a secure **session key** (symmetric encryption) for bulk of communication during session
- Communication between each computer theb uses symmetric key cryptography

User Authentication

- Crucial to identify user correctly, as protection systems depend on user ID
- User identity most often established through *passwords*, can be considered a special case of either keys or capabilities
  - Also can include something user has and /or a user attribute
- Passwords must be kept secret
  - Frequent change of passwords
  - Use of "non-guessable" passwords
  - Log all invalid access attempts
- Passwords may also either be encrypted or allowed to be used only once

Implementing Security Defenses

- **Defense in depth** is most common security theory – multiple layers of security
- Security policy describes what is being secured
- Vulnerability assessment compares real state of system / network compared to security policy
- Intrusion detection endeavors to detect attempted or successful intrusions
  - **Signature-based** detection spots known bad patterns
  - **Anomaly detection** spots differences from normal behavior
    - Can detect **zero-day** attacks
  - **False-positives** and **false-negatives** a problem
- Virus protection
- Auditing, accounting, and logging of all or specific system or network activities

Firewalling to Protect Systems and Networks

- A network firewall is placed between trusted and untrusted hosts
  - The firewall limits network access between these two security domains
- Can be tunneled or spoofed
  - Tunneling allows disallowed protocol to travel within allowed protocol (i.e. telnet inside of HTTP)
  - Firewall rules typically based on host name or IP address which can be spoofed
- **Personal firewall** is software layer on given host
  - Can monitor / limit traffic to and from the host
- **Application proxy firewall** understands application protocol and can control them (i.e. SMTP)
- **System-call firewall** monitors all important system calls and apply rules to them (i.e. this program can execute that system call)

Network Security Through Domain Separation Via Firewall



Computer Security Classifications

- U.S. Department of Defense outlines four divisions of computer security: **A**, **B**, **C**, and **D**.
- **D** – Minimal security.
- **C** – Provides discretionary protection through auditing. Divided into **C1** and **C2**. **C1** identifies cooperating users with the same level of protection. **C2** allows user-level access control.
- **B** – All the properties of **C**, however each object may have unique sensitivity labels. Divided into **B1**, **B2**, and **B3**.
- **A** – Uses formal design and verification techniques to ensure security.

Example: Windows XP

- Security is based on user accounts
  - Each user has unique security ID
  - Login to ID creates **security access token**
    - Includes security ID for user, for user's groups, and special privileges
    - Every process gets copy of token
    - System checks token to determine if access allowed or denied
- Uses a subject model to ensure access security. A subject tracks and manages permissions for each program that a user runs
- Each object in Windows XP has a security attribute defined by a security descriptor
  - For example, a file has a security descriptor that indicates the access permissions for all users

End of Chapter 15